Recently in the News:

Interview on "China's National Security Focus under Xi Jinping."  The Wire (Katrina Northrop). 12 March 2023.

"Is China's Straddle on Ukraine Coming to an End?" The Diplomat (Michael Clarke and Matthew Sussex). 11 March 2023.

• “Personalist authoritarian regimes,” Greitens reminds us, “tend to be information-sclerotic and avoid delivering bad news and negative feedback to leaders, even when that information seems obvious to an outside observer.”
  

"Slamming the Door on Scholarship."  Chronicle of Higher Education (Karin Fischer).  21 February 2023.

• [T]he climate for outside researchers [in China] had grown less hospitable before Covid.  A 2018 survey of 500 China-focused social scientists based outside of the country asked the scholars about “repressive research experiences” they encountered in China, and found that a quarter of them had been denied archival access. Five percent reported difficulty getting a visa, and nine percent said they had been “invited to tea,” that is, they had been questioned by police or other local authorities.

Slate "Political Gabfest" podcast, segment on protests in China, December 2022.

Hopkins Podcast on Foreign Affairs, "Zero-COVID Protests in China's Surveillance State." 2 December 2022.

War on the Rocks podcast, "China's Campaign Against the Uyhur People" (with Nury Turkel). 2 December 2022. 

"China's Xi Jinping Has No Easy Way Out." Newsweek (John Feng), 2 December 2022.

• "Beijing may think that as concerning as this week's protests are, the instability that would have resulted from pursuing a shift away from zero COVID would be worse," Chestnut Greitens told Newsweek."That calculus is subject to change as events unfold, but in the past Xi Jinping has spoken negatively of officials who hastily reverse course after a mass incident, which places a barrier to 'backing down' at this point."
• "In the long term, it will be important to understand how these events shape Xi Jinping's approach to internal and national security.  He's spent years investing in and establishing a system aimed at prevention of instability and unrest, and now faces multiple local points of failure in that system. It's unclear what happens after prevention fails — I suspect we're about to find out."

"China Rocked by Protests as Zero-COVID Anger Spreads." Financial Times (Edward White), 27 November 2022.

• Sheena Chestnut Greitens, a China expert at the American Enterprise Institute, said the widespread unrest could “become a serious test of the tools of social control developed under Xi.”

"Analysis of Xi-Biden Summit Delivers Calmer Tone, Reminder of Fault Lines." Radio Free Asia (Paul Eckert), 14 November 2022.

• “This was the first face-to-face meeting between President Biden and President Xi in about five years, and it occurred at a tense time in the US-China relationship,” said Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.   “[T]he buildup in Chinese military and nuclear capabilities, combined with a relative lack of dialogue to understand China's intentions and lack of robust crisis management mechanisms, pose significant risks to stability in the U.S.-China relationship."

"How World Affairs Will Shape the 2022 Midterm Elections." U.S. News & World Report (Paul Shinkman), 28 October 2022.

• "A lot of congressional focus has been on questions like strategic ambiguity, which are essentially declaratory policy,” says Sheena Chestnut Greitens, a professor at University of Texas at Austin and  Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.   “In the next Congress, I expect focus to shift to some very tough practical questions about what Taiwan's defense concept should be and whether the U.S. can provide some of the necessary capabilities and equipment on a timeframe that's actually useful." 

"Is Xi Jinping China's New Mao Zedong?" Al Jazeera,17 October 2022.

• “In the CCP’s narrative, if Mao’s legacy is the revolution itself, and Deng’s is reform and opening, then Xi’s is ‘national rejuvenation’," Chestnut Greitens told Al Jazeera. But there are few benchmarks to quantify the success of Xi’s “national rejuvenation," she says, and his legacy will not only depend on what he does, but also on how the world perceives the policies pursued.

"Putin is Testing the Limits of China's Friendship." Newsweek (John Feng), 28 September 2022. 

• "The obvious problem for [China's] diplomacy is that recognizing these 'referendum' results would create a precedent Beijing doesn't want (i.e., for potential future recognition of Taiwan based on a referendum there that doesn't go, shall we say, the CCP's way...)." 
• "In other words, this may end up being a hard limit on that 'no-limits' partnership (even in terms of diplomatic/ rhetorical support, where China's been pretty supportive of Russia)—since it creates direct problems for one of China's most important interests: Taiwan." 

"China Faces Skeptics with UNGA Pitch for Global Leader Status." Politico (Phelim Kine), 23 September 2022.

• “China is trying to use Ukraine to make its case that global security governance is broken [and] that the American alliance system is part of the problem and needs to be replaced or rethought,” said Sheena Chestnut Greitens, director of the Asia Policy Program at the University of Texas at Austin.
• “You’ll likely see a push [by Beijing] to try to reorganize global security governance in ways that are more favorable not just to Chinese foreign policy, or national interests … but also to the regime security interests of the Chinese Communist Party." 

"America's Lopsided China Strategy: Military Aid, but Not Enough Trade." Financial Times (Demetri Sevastopulo), 25 April 2022.

• “There has been a real vacuum in American trade policy towards Asia..... Asia is moving ahead on regional trade integration, with some willingness to include China, while the US has been largely absent.”

"If Xi Wants Out of His Putin Bromance, He Sure Isn’t Acting Like It."  The New Republic (Michael Cohen), 18 March 2022.

• According to Sheena Chestnut Greitens, an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs and China expert, there is also no evidence that Beijing is backing away from Russia. If anything, says Greitens, “China has pretty clearly doubled down.”  [In] international organizations, China initially abstained on votes regarding the conflict, including in the General Assembly’s condemnation of Russia’s actions. Now China is actively siding with Moscow, including in a recent symbolic vote in the International Court of Justice ordering Russia to “suspend” military operations in Ukraine. China was the only country on the court to vote alongside Russia. 
• The cost of Russian military or political collapse would be so severe, says Chestnut Greitens, that “[China] may be gradually more risk-acceptant to keep Russia afloat … as a counterweight to the United States and its partners.” From a political perspective, China’s alliance with Russia serves as a bulwark in its increasingly fractured relations with the West and, in particular, the U.S.

"China's Tightrope Walk Amid Russia's Invasion of Ukraine."  St. Louis Public Radio, 16 March 2022. 

• Beijing likely thinks it "needs Russia as a viable actor to counter the U.S., and the coalition that the U.S. has put together."
• “Unfortunately, one lesson China could be taking from this is, ‘How do we bring more force to bear to force an end to a conflict faster, if we choose to initiate one?’..... A protracted conflict has allowed diplomatic, economic, and military support for Ukraine to come into play..... On the Taiwan side, they'll be thinking about, ‘How do we keep that from happening?   It’s too early to say how a lot of it is going to play out, but the stakes are obviously very, very high."

"The Rising Costs of China's Friendship with Russia." Financial Times, 9 March 2022.

• [Chestnut Greitens] says the situation in Ukraine has forced China “on to its back foot”.  But while China says it supports a diplomatic solution, she says it is engaging in “platitudes”.  
• “They are invoking language about sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are being blatantly violated in front of the world,” says Chestnut Greitens.  But she adds that even if some Chinese officials did want to recalibrate relations with Russia, they would struggle precisely because Xi has put a “very personal stamp” on Sino-Russian relations.

"What UT Foreign/Security Experts are Watching as Russia Attacks Ukraine." KXAN, 3 March 2022.

• “I’ll be watching to see how events -- in terms of military operations in Ukraine, but also all of these aspects of the international response -- translate into regime security and pressure on Putin personally at home.”
• See also KVUE coverage here and this War on the Rocks podcast. 

"Deterrence has been achieved: Lieber trial signals broader federal aims to minimize disclosure violations." Harvard Crimson (Meimei Xu), 14 February 2022.

• According to Sheena Chestnut Greitens, professor at UT-Austin, the Department of Justice’s prosecution of scholars in violation of compliance regulations is only one facet of the federal government’s wider approach to preventing conflicts of interest or commitment in academic research.   “I think it’s a mistake to focus solely on the China Initiative without placing it in the context of larger shifts in federal policy, of which DOJ is only one part,” she wrote.
• “The [White House Office of Science and Technology Policy]-led effort, combined with some efforts in Congress, is a systematic attempt to tighten disclosure, conflict of interest, and conflict of commitment policies that have long been inconsistent across funders, universities, and individual units within those universities." 

"Winter Olympics: China Goes Big." Associated Press (Stephen Wade), 8 February 2022.

• “Authoritarian use of political symbols and propaganda can serve two purposes: to persuade audiences of the regime’s legitimacy, and to demonstrate state power.... I suspect that Beijing will use both during the Olympics, presenting domestic and international audiences with humanizing stories about ordinary Chinese people while also making sure they witness impressive displays of CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and state power.” 

"Can China Ever Reopen?" The Atlantic (Timothy McLaughlin), 5 February 2022.

• Under Xi’s leadership, “the core task is political security,’’ says [Chestnut Greitens].  This, she explained to me, means “security of China’s socialist system, of CCP leadership, and of Xi Jinping. And almost anything can be defined as a security threat, including the pandemic and its possible effects on domestic stability and the security of the CCP’s hold on power.”

"China's Olympics Get Underway in the Shadow of Abuses," The Hill (Niall Stanage), 4 February 2022. 

"Beijing's Olympic Opening is Chance to Win Over the World." Bloomberg (Lisa Du), 3 February 2022.

• “The Olympics can be useful [to Beijing] for bolstering China’s image because they draw attention from viewers who don’t necessarily pay lots of attention to global politics and foreign policy, where coverage of China’s behavior has been much more critical."
  
  

"Peng Shuai Case Threatens China's Goal of a Protest-Free Olympics."  Bloomberg, 27 January 2022.

• While China’s decisions to ban spectators and restrict mobility can be justified as public health measures, the experience of the 2008 Olympics still looms large for Communist Party leaders, according to Sheena Greitens....
  “Chinese leaders remember that history,” she said, “and are keen to avoid it.” 

"Chaos at Chinese Ports, Omicron, Threaten DPRK Trade Restart," NKNews (Ethan Jewell), 20 January 2022.

• [North Korea] is easily spooked when it comes to the pandemic.  “Pyongyang is observing a new, highly transmissible variant — in a country with a weak public health system, no vaccine program and almost no testing,” Sheena Greitens, a professor of authoritarian politics at the University of Texas, told NK Pro late last year.

"The New Normal?  Experts See Little Hope for Full Restart of NK-China Trade."  NKNews.  17 January 2022.

• With Omicron, "China's zero-COVID approach is going to be difficult to sustain."  That poses risks for North Korea, a neighboring country with "a weak public health system, no vaccine program, and almost no testing... [It's] probably one of the worst-prepared countries in the world for a variant like Omicron.  Tightened internal control seems to be one of the only tools Pyongyang is comfortable deploying."

"What's Going on Between the United States, Taiwan, and China?" Texas Standard NPR. 3 November 2021.

"Beijing Olympics Open in 4 Months; Human Rights Talk Absent." Associated Press (Stephen Wade). 4 October 2021.

• "These measures can be justified as public health measures, said [Greitens], "but they have the ancillary benefit of avoiding a repeat of the last time the Olympics were held in Beijing, in 2008,  when the torch relay was disrupted repeatedly by protestors and there were also protest attempts during the Games themselves.”

"Bill Proposed to Alter Taiwan Ties, but Experts See Concern." Newsweek (John Feng).  4 March 2021.

• "Wording in the United States' policy toward China and Taiwan has always been really important, because seemingly minor changes in phrasing can be interpreted as major changes in U.S. policy."   [Greitens said that] it is now increasingly important to understand these distinctions as U.S. national security policy focuses more attention on Asia.  "[P]eople who don't focus on Asia are going to have to get up to speed on these issues, which means understanding how language has been used to send diplomatic signals, and what certain changes in language are going to mean to audiences in the region."
• Taiwan is among the policy areas that has historically seen bipartisan support in Washington, according to both Lewis and Greitens.... Greitens said this provided "a sounder foundation for Taiwan policy than having big partisan political divergences."

"As Genocide Allegations Grow, China Hits Back," Politico (Melissa Chan). 25 February 2021.

• [Greitens] was quick to point out that even a crimes against humanity designation puts China in the company of North Korea, and that 'no one should read this as any kind of exoneration.'

"To Cancel or Not? IOC, Japan Press Ahead with Tokyo Games." Associated Press (Stephen Wade, Yuri Kageyama). 13 January 2021.

"Privacy and Surveillance in China." Tech Policy podcast (Corbin Barthold). 10 January 2021.

"Could China Conquer Taiwan?" The Red Line podcast (Michael Hilliard), 11 January 2021.

"대북전단금지법, 바이든 행정부에 ‘북 인권’ 관심 제고  [ROK Anti-Leaflet Law Could Raise Interest in N.Korean Human Rights under Biden Administration]," Radio Free Asia (in Korean, with Hee Jung Yang). 5 January 2021.

"Xinjiang: What's Worked, What Hasn't, and What's Next?" CSIS Panel. 16 December 2020.

"Women in Global Leadership."   LBJ School's In the Arena conversation with Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter.  2 December 2020.

"On Strategy & Security with China." Interview with The Catalyst, George W. Bush Institute, December 2020.

"China's Threats to Academic Freedom Rise at Home, Abroad."  University World News (Yojana Sharma).  20 November 2020.

"Coercion and Strategy in an Era of Great Power Competition: China." West Point Military Academy, Modern War Institute annual War Studies Conference. 4 November 2020.  [Link to panel video.]

"After Election, Washington Remains Anti-China, but States See Things Differently." South China Morning Post (Jacob Fromer), 10 November 2020.

• [Greitens] noted that “for a long time, the economic side of the US-China relationship was the more cooperative side, compared to security issues”.  Now, though, she added: “There has been enough warning rhetoric about Chinese influence, espionage, and other issues from the administration and federal law enforcement that [state &] local actors may have internalised some real wariness of China. They may perceive cooperation to be more risky – especially if they are aware that their own in-house expertise on China is limited.”

"Not Just Over There: The US Commitment to the Korean Peninsula." War on the Rocks "Horns of a Dilemma" podcast, 6 November 2020.

"What Happened at the HK Consulate?"  SupChina newsletter (Jeremy Goldkorn). 27 October 2020.

• "The U.S. recently said it would include HK asylum claims in [its] formal refugee admissions program. Definitional note: asylum is typically claimed in U.S. (or at border); refugee admission is processed abroad. Similar standards, difference is location… So why turn people away? [The U.S. is] likely worried that the HK consulate will become a center of confrontation: police trying to prevent ppl from getting in; students/others trying increasingly desperate methods to gain access; then subsequent diplomatic standoff to extricate people to the U.S...."

"What to do about Xinjiang." Appearance on Lawfare podcast with Jacob Schulz and Jordan Schneider. 28 October 2020.

"Current American Perspectives on China." Appearance on U.S.-Asia Institute podcast Asia Unscripted. 22 October 2020.

"Dreams of a Red Emperor: the relentless rise of Xi Jinping." Los Angeles Times (Alice Su). 22 October 2020.

• In July, [Xi] announced a new “education and rectification” campaign to discipline China’s political and legal systems, including police officers, judges and members of the secretive Ministry of State Security.... It is unusual that Xi “does not perceive his power to be completely consolidated, even eight years in,” said Sheena Greitens, a professor of public affairs who studies Chinese approaches to security at the University of Texas at Austin. Xi may be launching this campaign to prepare for 2022, when he will transition into an unprecedented third term, she said.

"China's Great Power Play Puts Asia on Edge." Financial Times.  15 September 2020.

• “China’s foreign policy is increasingly a reflection of the attempt to seek regime security . . . at home,” said [Greitens]. “The CCP treats things as serious threats that might have been tolerated before.”

"Chinese Students Face Increased Scrutiny in the US."  BBC (Zhaoyin Feng). 5 September 2020.

• [Greitens] says there's an "intensification of concerns" over technology transfer from the US to China through academic channels.... [She] expects some increased scrutiny of Chinese nationals studying science and technology in the US, especially those who received Chinese government funding, to continue regardless of the outcome of the US election. "Both (Trump and Biden) administrations are likely to take the potential threat of illegal technology transfer between the US and China very seriously," she says.

"China Provoked India in Latest Clash, US Believes."  US News & World Report (Paul Shinkman).  1 September 2020.

• "The timing is puzzling given the upcoming U.S.-India talks and what appeared to be some recent – if not particularly successful – efforts to reduce tensions along the border....  One effect of the standoff has been to add a sense of urgency to efforts to strengthen U.S.-India ties, especially in terms of defense cooperation," Greitens adds. "But developments at the 2+2 shouldn't be viewed as a knee-jerk response to this week's flare-up: There's a long-standing interest in the United States in strengthening ties with India in its own right."
• Moderator for War on the Rocks podcast, "The Indo-Pacific Triangle: China, India, & the United States," with Tanvi Madan and Jim Steinberg, 21 August 2020.

"China Watcher Roundtable: Protecting Students at US Schools After the Hong Kong National Security Law." Politico video roundtable (David Wertime). 27 August 2020. 

• Partial summary in print here.

"National Security Law Adds New Risks to Higher Education."  Deutsche Welle News (William Yang). 24 August 2020.

• "There are strategies instructors can adopt to mitigate risk and protect students’ freedom of speech....  But ultimately, [nothing] an individual instructor based in the US can do will completely remove the risk, because at a fundamental level, the risk is generated by PRC's national security law and an apparently-heightened willingness of Chinese authorities to apply that legal framework in extraterritorial contexts."
• Mandarin-language version here.

"Drive the Blade In: Xi Shakes Up China's Law-and-Order Forces." New York Times (Chris Buckley). 20 August 2020.

• “It suggests a continued push on Xi Jinping’s part to remake China’s coercive apparatus into a force that is entirely politically responsive to his direction,” said [Greitens], who studies Chinese policing and has written a forthcoming paper about the drive to clean up China’s law-and-order bureaucracy. Mr. Xi wants “to push his authority downward throughout the lower levels of the political-legal system” before the party congress in 2022, she said.

"One Question Hung Over 2008 Games: Would They Change China?"  Associated Press (Stephen Wade). 16 August 2020.

• [Greitens] said the world financial crisis that followed the Olympics by a month, and the rise of General Secretary Xi Jinping, changed China far more than Olympic spectacle. She was in Beijing at the time doing research and studying Chinese.  “The Beijing Olympics get the attention of viewers who don’t necessarily pay lots of attention to global politics and foreign policy otherwise, and that heightens the impact of hosting the Olympics on overall public attention to China,” she wrote. “Any country that hosts an event like the Olympics can use it to present the country to the world in a positive light. Authoritarian states probably have fewer constraints in doing that than democracies, because they are less accountable to the public in organizing and spending on the event. They can also more tightly control protest and media coverage that might provide a more nuanced or alternative narrative about the host country.”

"Curing a Virus with Authoritarianism: Will the Legacy of the Novel Coronavirus be Eroding Civil Liberties?  Bloomberg (Andrew Browne). 15 August 2020.

• China, where the Covid-19 outbreak originated, has seized upon the pandemic to add to its existing state surveillance. In dealing with the crisis, scholars Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Julian Gewirtz note that Chinese leaders have fused the concepts of public health and national security. This effort, in Chinese Communist Party-speak, is known as “fangkong,” or “prevent and control.” Local public security bureaus have been helping companies develop health-monitoring apps, and then making use of the data these apps spew out—everything from body temperatures to social contacts--to profile citizens in minute detail.  “Democracies must develop a clear and distinct vision for the future relationship between health and security so that China’s approach does not become the world’s,” write Greitens and Gewirtz.

"Targeting WeChat, Trump Takes Aim at China's Bridge to the World."  New York Times (Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong).  7 August 2020. 

• “There are legitimate concerns with WeChat's involvement in censorship & surveillance.  However, the downside of this executive order is that it addresses these concerns by taking steps that also make it harder to directly communicate with ordinary people in China.... It puts this administration policy into conflict with another one of its stated goals: to maintain openness and friendly connections with the Chinese people."
  
  

"Trump Takes Aim at TikTok & WeChat." Appearance on the Lawfare podcast (with Bobby Chesney & Ron Deibert).  12 August 2020.

"Trump's TikTok Drama is a Distraction."  Wired (Louise Matsakis).  5 August 2020. 

• “One of the things the US has to grapple with is that there’s often some genuine demand for [Chinese surveillance technology] products, despite their downsides,” says Sheena Greitens, an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and an expert on East Asia and authoritarian politics.  Last week, Greitens recommended to a federal commission that the US develop a comprehensive national strategy for dealing with Chinese surveillance technology, which is increasingly used around the world."

"This is the Hardliner China Chose to Oversee Hong Kong's Security."  Bloomberg.  4 August 2020.

• “China’s model of social governance and social management has been very focused on prevention of conflict and unrest... It’s likely that Beijing is hoping that the office in Hong Kong will shift officials there toward using some of the more preventive approaches we’ve seen deployed in mainland China.”

"What Role Does China Play in US Politics?"  Appearance on China Business Review (Ian Hutchinson, US-China Business Council). 4 August 2020.

"Explaining the Plight of China's Uighurs."  The Dispatch (Nate Hochman).  3 August 2020.

• “The CCP often uses medical language to describe its policies,” says Sheena Greitens. “Chinese officials routinely liken perceived threats in Xinjiang to cancer and infectious disease. The implication of this medical analogy to a domestic audience inside China is that the state, in locking up citizens en masse, is acting on the caring, curative intent of a doctor rather than the repressive impulses of an authoritarian regime. But the analogy also reveals something far more problematic—the logic of ‘immunization’ dictates that security depends on targeting and ‘treating’ citizens long before they have shown any symptoms of threatening behavior. So by definition, large numbers of innocent people are being targeted for ‘treatment.’.... [T]he CCP is willing to incur large costs for policies that it believes will contribute to its political survival, even in the face of external backlash—whether that's in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, or somewhere else in the future.” 

"China's Home Security Chief Attends Hong Kong National Security Office Opening."  South China Morning Post (William Zheng).  8 July 2020.

• [Greitens] said Hong Kong now definitely qualified as one of the “most critical” cities for China’s security.  “Since Xi’s ascent, we’ve seen more statements about the need to prevent diffusion of political threats from abroad into China. Hong Kong has always been one site where the Chinese Communist Party is particularly sensitive or prone to seeing foreign infiltration aimed at destabilising the party,” she said.... Greitens expects that a major task for mainland security forces in Hong Kong will be to focus on “identifying connections between Hongkongers and foreign organisations/governments that it believes could undermine the security of the CCP’s hold on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region – the ‘transmission nodes’ by which foreign influence could enter and destabilise the Chinese body politic”.

Appearance on Slate's "Political Gabfest."  28 May 2020.

"Tokyo Olympics Followed by 3 More Mega-Events, All in China." Associated Press (Stephen Wade). 22 May 2020.

• [Greitens] said large sports events give China high visibility....  “They provide a way for China to boost its cultural and ‘discourse power’ globally,” Greitens wrote in an email. “And they do so in a forum that generally emphasizes international cooperation and is weighted away from the serious disagreements that many countries have with China over territorial conflict, human rights, and trade, among other topics.”

"As US-China Rhetoric Grows Harsher, New Risks Emerge with Taiwan." Washington Post (Gerry Shih, Eva Dou, Anne Gearan). 20 May 2020.

• The escalating friction is a "perfect storm" of several factors, said Greitens, with "tough-on-China" campaigning ahead of the election and the global pandemic laying bare some of the transparency problems in China's government.  "Regardless, one lesson for the future is that American strategy and national security  shouldn't depend on or assume transparency from China," she said, "because it's not an empirically valid assumption to make given the nature and structure of China's domestic politics."