

al-Anani, Hazem Kandil, and Tewfik Aclimandos had already suggested, albeit to different degrees, that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was ideologically more rigid and, crucially, much more internally divided. The post-revolutionary period simply exposed the diverging trajectories of the two movements and while the outcome might have indeed been different due to the volatility of transitional times, it was not as surprising for area-studies experts to see that institutional compromise would be much more difficult to achieve in Egypt than Tunisia.

A similar point could be made about cross-ideological cooperation, which Stepan and other contributors to the volume rightly perceive as fundamental in ensuring that regime change leads to the instauration of democracy. Janine Clark, Michaëlle Browers, Eva Wegner, Miquel Pellicer, and Hendrik Kraetzschmar among others have worked on cross-ideological cooperation in the Arab world for well over a decade before the uprisings, reaching similar conclusions to the ones that are found in this book, namely that cooperation is indeed possible under specific circumstances and that even temporary cross-ideological alliances can lead to considerable gains *vis à vis* authoritarian regimes. When authoritarian regimes are then removed, cross-ideological cooperation, where successful, can overcome mutual suspicions, as the case of Tunisia demonstrates, particularly if there is a history of it. While cross-ideological coalitions had existed in Egypt as well before Mubarak's dismissal, they were not as deep as in the Tunisian case.

Another unsurprising element that emerges from the book is the unreliability of categories such as "Islamist" and "secular" as if they were un-problematic and mutually exclusive, particularly when associated to the supposed values they carry: Islamists are authoritarian by definition and seculars are democratic by definition. Monica Marks' excellent chapter illustrates this fallacy in the Tunisian case, but, again, this is not a novelty for scholars of the Arab world. Steve Cook and Lahouari Addi made this point over a decade ago and Anne Wolf did so more recently by also looking at the Tunisian case. Finally, the role militaries play in transition to democracy has come again under scrutiny in the Egyptian and Tunisian transitions because of the widely diverging role that men in uniform had during and after the uprisings. Contrary to Egypt, where the army has traditionally played a central role in politics, the limited political role of the Tunisian military stems from the way in which the post-colonial state was constructed under Bourguiba. It is not unsurprising that the two institutions acted differently when faced with similar choices, as Mourad Chabbi has also explored when looking at the path-dependent behavior of Arab militaries.

Stepan's edited volume is necessary reading for those who are interested in the dynamics of democratization, the challenges it faces, and the opportunities it provides. It is

a solid contribution to transitology more generally and it has the merit of putting to rest conventional wisdoms about the role of religion in the Muslim world. It might have been interesting, though, to have a chapter looking at the achievements of the only Arab country that, according to the criteria that Stepan set, has successfully democratized. While Tunisia can legitimately claim to be a political-institutional democracy, it is far from achieving what one might expect when adopting a substantive definition of democracy. As established democracies across the world are beginning to learn, without its socio-economic element, procedural and institutional democracy might not be considered as such by a significant portion of the population.

**Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence.** By Sheena Chestnut Greitens. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2016. 240p. \$105.00 cloth, \$30.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592718002402

— Paul Staniland, *University of Chicago*

Authoritarian regimes rely on some degree of repression to maintain power. Yet the modes of repression they deploy vary in important ways, ranging from massive campaigns of civilian killing to restrained but thorough everyday surveillance. Sheena Chestnut Greitens tackles this variation in an impressive and thoughtful book, arguing that the foundational threat perceptions of authoritarian leaders structure how they organize their security apparatuses. These structures create different incentives and organizational processes that raise or lower the amount and scope of violence used by these regimes against internal opponents.

Greitens focuses on coercive institutions that address internal, rather than external, threats, because challenges from within pose the greatest danger to authoritarian rulers. She argues that autocrats face two possible threats: "mass-based" popular revolts versus "elite-based" coups (p. 19). They have to prioritize one of the two and build coercive institutions that are best suited to dealing with that chosen threat. The perceived "dominant threat" (p. 32) at the time of a coercive institution's founding explains its consequent structure and functioning.

The author focuses on the negative effects of perceived elite threats: In response, autocrats pursue "coup-proofing" strategies that fragment internal security forces and make them socially exclusionary. This fragmentation and exclusion helps to protect autocrats from coups, but also weakens intelligence about society, creates competition and rivalries, and undermines consistent strategy (pp. 53–54). Such apparatuses are more likely to engage in high levels of relatively indiscriminate violence against civilians.

By contrast, autocrats who are primarily focused on mass threats from below will build inclusive and cohesive security institutions aimed at penetrating, monitoring, and controlling society (p. 31). They will be more skilled

at securing the regime without high levels of violence. Greitens locates the origins of these institutions in moments of contingent choice, when autocrats building their regimes need to choose which threat is most pressing (pp. 32–36). While change is possible, she argues that it is most likely to degrade inclusive/cohesive institutions into exclusionary/fragmented ones.

Greitens assesses this theory using detailed empirical research from South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. She seeks to measure the scope, intensity, and discrimination of state violence (p. 65) across the cases and over time within them. The research design is appropriate to the question at hand, and she provides substantial evidence on the origins, evolution, and functioning of autocrats' security apparatuses.

The author shows how Ferdinand Marcos encouraged rivalry and competition within his security apparatus in the Philippines, leading to poorly coordinated and often inefficient violence. While more discussion of the large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao and against the New People's Army, as well as their implications for her argument, would have been valuable, Greitens is persuasive in showing that Marcos's fear of rival elites and fostering of competition and rivalry within his own regime undermined the stability and coherence of regime repression.

As for Taiwan, Greitens identifies a change over time, with reforms in the early 1950s moving from elite- to mass-focused organization and a corresponding shift in the nature of violence. This case shows how potentially malleable perceptions and institutions can be—the “profound rethinking” (p. 86) of the regime's position in the late 1940s was the trigger for a major shift—but how in this instance it required a contingent blend of causal factors. The Taiwan case is based on deep historical research, including a careful reconstruction of the organization of the Kuomintang Party's security apparatus.

The most complex case is South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Do Hwan. The South Korean military was highly cohesive (p. 145), but internal security forces differed according to the dominant perceived threats being faced by autocrats, including interesting “mixed” blends of exclusivity and inclusivity in some periods (p. 143). The case gets much more complicated than the theoretical argument, but Greitens handles this complexity well, and shows how even her basic framework can still illuminate subnational variation and the overlap of different levels of aggregation (for instance, pp. 169–71).

This is an impressive book that forces scholars to think much more carefully about the uses and varieties of authoritarian repression: While patronage, legislatures, and coalitions are obviously important, there is also a coldly lethal core to autocratic rule. There are, however, areas in which the author's argument is less persuasive.

First, the hard choice between mass- and elite-based threats is not fully compelling. Greitens argues that security apparatuses can have only one of two “mutually exclusive institutional designs” (p. 32), privileging one threat over the other. This is asserted more than it is proven. Regimes have a variety of ways of finessing or sidestepping this dilemma. Above all, many governments (both democratic and authoritarian) construct dedicated internal security forces that can handle mass threats while also building either a professional or politically controlled military that can handle external threats while also acting as a check on the coup potential of internal security forces. Interior ministries are different from defense ministries; police are different from armies. This institutional complexity need not introduce debilitating rivalries, but instead might act as a reasonable form of specialization in tasks.

Second, the fusing together of inclusion and cohesiveness (and of exclusion and fragmentation) is problematic. Greitens scopes out separatist conflicts, for instance, but these are major preoccupations of many authoritarian regimes that can break apart the simple dichotomy at the heart of the theory. Exclusionary but cohesive security apparatuses are quite common in such contexts: Burma/Myanmar and Pakistan, for instance, have both had ruling militaries that are simultaneously socially exclusionary (dominated by particular ethnic groups) and highly unified, while being deployed at times against both separatists on the periphery and dissidents in the political core. Minority-rule regimes in Rwanda, Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain have also had this characteristic.

Third, change over time seems a bit easier and more fluid than Greitens' theoretical framework suggests: Although she argues that change should be in the direction of mass-focused to elite-focused organization (p. 62), both in Taiwan and in South Korea there are shifts in the opposite direction.

Finally, it is not always apparent what state violence is doing in Greitens's account. The bulk of the theory frames violence as arising from coup-proofing-oriented apparatuses that fall back on violence as a suboptimal outcome resulting from organizational dysfunction. Yet the author notes in the conclusion that this approach does not account for revolutionary communist cases like China and North Korea (pp. 301–3). These are certainly not the only cases in which ambitious regimes pursued violence intentionally as a tool of transformation and terror; contemporary Syria comes to mind as a dramatic example of the intentional, deliberate use of extremely high levels of violence by a regime fixated on threats of mass unrest from below. In many such cases, substantial violence is a feature, not a bug, of regime behavior, and treating it as an aberrant by-product of organizational incentives sidesteps the ideological and political goals of autocratic (and democratic) leaders.

These concerns aside, Greitens has offered a substantial contribution to our understanding of how autocrats seek

to maintain their power in the face of prospective threats both from below and from within the elite. *Dictators and their Secret Police* deserves wide readership and discussion.

**Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China.** By Rory Truex. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 232p. \$93.99 cloth, \$35.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592718002384

— Yuhua Wang, *Harvard University*

This is a beautifully written book that advances a new framework on representation and the legislature in authoritarian regimes. Political scientists have long considered democratic elections to be the precondition for representation. But can meaningful representation arise in an authoritarian setting?

By examining the people's congress system in China, Rory Truex provides a coherent analytical framework and convincing empirical evidence that representation does exist in an autocracy, but warns that the representation is "within bounds" (p. 6). Truex's argument starts with the assumption that the autocrat has incomplete information about citizen preferences, and parliamentary representatives can help reduce information uncertainties by fostering the revelation of citizen grievances. The revelation, however, may engender unwanted citizen attention and possible collective action. To solve this "information-attention tradeoff" (p. 5), the autocrat engineers the ideal parliamentary representative who conveys citizen preferences only on nonpolitical issues but keeps quiet about citizen demands for sensitive issues (such as democratic reform). This behavioral pattern becomes a state of equilibrium because representatives have empathy with the citizens and meanwhile can benefit financially from having a parliamentary seat.

This framework (formalized in Chapter 2) generates important insights, which Truex then tests using a wide range of micro-level data. Chapter 3 uses a subset of opinions from Hainan's Provincial People's Congress to show that the opinions of deputies exert a real influence on policy outcomes. Survey results demonstrate that citizens are generally optimistic about the influence of deputies on many nonpolitical issues, but skeptical about its ability to have an effect on sensitive issues. Chapter 4 uses data on deputies' backgrounds and behavior to show that their policy proposals reflect the concerns of their geographic constituents on a range of nonpolitical issues, but very few proposals directly challenge the regime's core political interests. Chapter 5 studies the career paths of deputies and shows that they are rewarded for their representative activities, but punished if they transgress certain boundaries. Chapter 6 analyzes a subset of deputies who are business leaders and shows that a seat in the National People's Congress can bring personal returns to their companies. Chapter 7 provides a brief history of the National People's

Congress and demonstrates that representation was strengthened in the face of revolutionary threat, such as during the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square movements of the 1980s. Chapter 8 then concludes by considering the framework's generalizability to other authoritarian regimes, such as Vietnam and Cuba.

I want to highlight two contributions the book makes. The first contribution, a theoretical one, is that "representation within bounds" provides a new lens through which we should look at legislative institutions in authoritarian regimes. The nascent literature on authoritarian politics, reflected in the works of Lisa Blaydes, Jennifer Gandhi, Beatriz Magaloni, Edmund Malesky, and Milan Svoblik, primarily examines these institutions as co-optation or power-sharing mechanisms. But as Truex shows, most deputies in China do not offer opinions in opposition to those of the regime (different from the co-optation view), and many deputies feel a sense of responsibility to serve their constituents and are less concerned about their factional interests (different from the power-sharing view). "Representation within bounds," therefore, better explains these observational anomalies, at least in the Chinese case.

The second contribution, an empirical one, is that the book differs from many of the aforementioned influential works by offering a micro-level examination of deputy behavior and opinions. Some of the leading studies in this camp examine cross-national variations in political institutions and autocratic survival. Truex instead draws on micro-level evidence, following a great tradition in the study of the Chinese legislature contributed by Young Nam Cho, Kevin O'Brien, Melanie Manion, and Murray Scot Tanner, which provides a more vivid picture of how representation actually works in an authoritarian regime. I also want to applaud the quality and triangulation of different types of evidence. The utilization of large-n data sets on deputy backgrounds, legislative behaviors, career outcomes, and financial connections, as well as surveys of netizens and primary legislative documents, supplemented by the author's interviews with deputies, citizens, financial experts, and political insiders, not only reveals the general patterns of institutional dynamics but also helps the reader make sense of the quantitative findings and sort out different mechanisms.

*Making Autocracy Work* is also laudable for its style. The narrative at the beginning of each chapter immediately captivates the reader. Every chapter ends with a section on "Limitations and Alternative Perspectives," which provides great transparency and introduces competing explanations.

The book also raises some interesting questions about the National People's Congress and authoritarian institutions. If the autocrat's objective is to stay in power (p. 5), we should expect the autocrat to be most interested in information on citizen grievances over politically sensitive