China's Internal Security Spending:
An Assessment of New Data

Sheena Chestnut Greitens*

November 2025

Forthcoming, *China Quarterly*

Abstract:

Internal security has been a governance priority under Xi Jinping. How does China's budget reflect this prioritization? This article presents updated data on China's internal security spending, 1992-2022, revealing a mix of continuity and change. Domestic security expenditure continues to rise, more than doubling from 2012-2022, but has risen mostly in proportion to the PRC's overall expenditure. The balance between central and local expenditure has shifted further toward local spending, which, in the context of rising local fiscal constraint, may increase pressure on local Public Security Bureaus. The Ministry of Public Security continues to receive the largest share of domestic security spending, while the proportion of internal security spending allocated to the People's Armed Police has decreased, probably reflecting the reorganization of the PAP in 2017-18. Spending per capita and relative to GDP continue to be higher in locations that are politically sensitive, including Beijing, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

Keywords: domestic security; internal security; public security; policing; authoritarian stability; coercive capacity; stability management (*weiwen*); Commission on Law and Politics (*zhengfawei*); China

*Corresponding Author. LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas-Austin. sheena.greitens@austin.utexas.edu
The author thanks Jinhong Li for excellent research assistance, and a grant from the UT-Austin LBJ School's Policy Research Institute for financial support.

Introduction

This article provides an updated overview and analysis of internal security spending by the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1992 to 2022, building on work covering 1992-2012 that was previously published in *The China Quarterly*.[1] A new dataset, now publicly available online, covers the past three decades, including the first two terms of Xi Jinping's (习近平) tenure.[2]

Broadly speaking, the updated data on China's internal security spending reveal a mix of continuity and change. China's domestic security expenditure continues to increase rapidly, more than doubling over the course of 2012-2022, but has risen mostly in proportion to the rest of the PRC's budget. The balance between central and local expenditure has shifted slightly more toward decentralized funding of domestic security, providing context for recent high-level expressions of concern about the revenue-generating activities of local Public Security Bureaus (PSBs) in an era of increased local fiscal constraint. Within the internal security apparatus, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS, 公安部) continues to receive the lion's share of domestic security spending, and that share has risen since 2012. By contrast, the proportion of internal security spending allocated to the People's Armed Police (PAP, 武警) has decreased (likely reflecting a reorganization in 2017-18), though the PAP's budget has continued to rise. Internal security spending, both per capita and relative to GDP, tends to be higher in locations that are politically sensitive, including Beijing, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

Overall Trends in China's Internal Security Spending

China's domestic security budget has been a frequent point of reference in both media and academic discourse since internal security expenditure first surpassed spending on national defense in 2011.[3] Internal security spending generally refers to expenditure on China's political-legal system (政法系统), typically composed of public security, the procuratorate, courts, and justice (公检法司) as well as the People's Armed Police; it appears under a grouped heading (公共安全支出) in publications by the PRC Ministry of Finance. Understanding the PRC's domestic security spending is

[1] Chestnut Greitens 2017. This article uses "internal" and "domestic" interchangeably with reference to spending.

[2] Sheena Chestnut Greitens, "China's Internal Security Spending," Version 1.0, Harvard Dataverse, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FZTGYI

[3] Buckley 2011; Blanchard and Ruwitch 2013.

important for debates over the extent and nature of securitization under Xi Jinping, as well as discussions of China's overall coercive capacity and authoritarian stability.[4]

Such understanding is also important for ongoing discussion on how to interpret and measure China's military spending, as debates over defense spending hinge, in part, on which line-items and categories of spending should be considered part of China's military budget versus the internal security budget (for example, the gendarmerie-like PAP, discussed below), and how to treat off-budget adjustments to official statistics. (External analysts generally agree that the defense budget is substantially larger than official figures when appropriate off-budget expenses are included, but estimates of *how much* larger vary widely.)[5]

Figure 1, below, shows China's official internal security spending from 1992 to 2022, placed alongside official defense spending for comparative purposes.

Figure 1: China's Defense and Internal Security Expenditures (1992-2022)



[4] For example, Wang 2014; Wang and Minzner 2015; Chestnut Greitens 2023.

[5] For a review of these debates, see Fravel et al 2024; Tian and Su 2021; McGerty 2024; IISS 2001–2022; Liff and Erickson 2013. For historical context, see Blasko and Corbett 1998; Cheung 1996; Forsythe 2014; Fravel 2007; Martinson 2014; Tanner 2002.

Figure 1 shows a continued rise in overall internal security expenditure throughout the past decade, continuing the previous two decades of spending growth. In absolute/nominal terms, the domestic security budget more than doubled from 2012 to 2022, rising from 711.2 billion RMB to 1.44 trillion RMB in 2022.[6] Using average market exchange rates for those years, that translates to roughly $112.7 billion USD to ~$214 billion USD.[7] Internal security expenditure also, however, shows a plateau from 2018 to 2021, which we explain at least partly with reference to a reorganization that moved parts of the PAP and MPS into a new Ministry of Emergency Management (MEM, 应急管理部), which does not fall under the internal security budget.

Similar to defense spending, important categories of internal security spending do not appear in official expenditure totals. And similar to defense spending, the excluded categories could add considerably to estimates of total expenditure if published and counted. Extrabudgetary expenditures for internal security include: the Ministry of State Security (MSS, 国家安全部); the party political-legal commissions that lead and manage public security work at various levels of China's political system; and the MEM, which as a new ministry created in 2018 absorbed some previous PAP and MPS units and has some responsibility for planning and maintaining social stability under emergency conditions.[8] MEM, for example, would have added 68.5 billion RMB to internal security expenditure in 2022, an amount 1.4 times larger than the Ministry of Justice (48.3 billion RMB) and slightly smaller than the procuratorate (72.7 billion RMB). The MSS budget under Xi remains unknown, in a period when that Ministry has taken on a much more visible role, adding an unknown amount to the total.

Figure 2 shows the share of overall government expenditure devoted to internal security from 1992 to 2022.

[6] In 2022, China's official defense budget was 1.45 trillion RMB, roughly comparable to but slightly higher than the official internal security budget. For a review of debate on defense spending measurement, see Fravel et al 2024.

[7] Figures showing CPI-deflated spending over time and spending relative to GDP appear in the Appendix.

[8] Wang 2018; Chestnut Greitens and Rinaldi, forthcoming.

Figure 2: Internal Security Expenditure as a Proportion of Overall Expenditure



Figure 2 shows that, although internal security spending has increased as a proportion of overall expenditure since 1992, its share of the budget is not significantly higher under Xi Jinping (2012-2022) than in the previous period (1992-2012). Internal security expenditure remains between 5% and 7% of the overall spending. In 2012, the percentage of national expenditure allocated to domestic security was 5.6%; in 2022, that percentage was 5.5%.

How to interpret internal security as a share of overall spending is, of course, open to interpretation. One possible interpretation is that China has been able to pursue its approach to internal security without a clear budgetary tradeoff: growth in domestic security spending, as a line-item, has not necessarily come at the expense of other budget categories. This, however, fails to account for "securitization" if other actors in the Chinese political system have been required to take security measures that are accounted for in their budgets, rather than appearing solely in the stand-alone internal security expenditure.

There is some indication of securitization dynamics. For example, MEM does not fall under the domestic security budget, but an updated 2025 requirement for local authorities to generate "emergency response plans" now requires non-security actors (such as education systems) to plan for how they will address "social security emergencies," including mass incidents, meaning that emergency

management has a strong domestic stability component.[9] Moreover, for the last several years, the PRC has earmarked (by issuing a special long-term treasury bond) an additional $700-800 billion RMB for "implementation of major national strategies and security capacity-building in key areas" that is not included in the regular annual domestic security budget; according to the Ministry of Finance's March 2025 report, the last round of this funding appears to have been spent largely on infrastructure (railways, highways, airports, etc) and how much of it should be considered internal security spending is subject to interpretation.[10]

One major difference between China's defense spending and its internal security spending is that the latter is primarily the responsibility of provincial and local governments, rather than the center.[11] Previous work showed that the burden for spending on domestic security and stability has shifted over time toward localities; Figure 3 shows that this trend has continued.

Figure 3: Local Spending as a Proportion of Total Internal Security Spending



[9] See, for example, 福州市教育局 [Fuzhou Municipal Education Bureau], "福州市教育系统突发事件应急预案 [Fuzhou City Education System Emergency Response Plan], January 2023. For the national-level guidance, see "中共中央 国务院印发《国家突发事件总体应急预案》[CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council Issue 'National Emergency Comprehensive Response Plan']," 25 February 2025, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202502/content_7005635.htm.

[10] MOF 2025.

[11] We follow the National Bureau of Statistics conventions in our use of the terms "central" and "local"; for further explanation, please see the online Appendix.

Provincial and local governments are now responsible for slightly more of the PRC's domestic security expenditure than they were a decade ago: from below 80% in the pre-2000 period to 83% in 2012 to 86% of internal security spending in 2022.

This rising fiscal burden occurs in the context of declining local fiscal revenues and an overall budget deficit. The combination of these trends may explain (and exacerbate) apparent recent concern at senior levels of the party-state leadership that budget pressures could be pushing local PSBs to use coercive or predatory tactics to offset revenue shortfalls by imposing false or inflated fines and confiscating property illicitly.[12] In spring 2025, the Supreme People's Procuratorate launched a campaign of targeted supervision to eradicate "illegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement" (*weigui yidi zhifa he qulixing zhifa*, 违规异地执法和趋利性执法),[13] a phenomenon sometimes known as "distant/deep sea fishing" (*yang bulao,* 洋捕捞).[14] Figure 3's focus on the domestic security expenditure burden that falls on local governments, therefore, provides a note of caution in assuming, as one might in looking at Figure 2, that the party-state has faced no "guns-butter" tradeoff when it comes to internal security spending. In China, this may take the form of a tradeoff between stability maintenance and routine criminal policing, as MPS and local PSBs are required to do both, and analyses in both Chinese and English have highlighted resource shortfalls.[15]

Spending Breakdown: Categories

Previous scholarship has noted the utility of understanding "not only the total amount that China spends, but also how it spends these resources."[16] Figures 4-5, therefore, show how domestic security expenditure has been allocated to different actors within China's internal security apparatus.

---

[12] "Shakedown: The Chinese Government is Cracking Down on Predatory Law Enforcement," *The Economist*, 27 March 2025; Chestnut Greitens 2025.

[13] 巩宸宇，孙风娟，"最高检部署开展违规异地执法和趋利性执法司法专项监督" [SPP Deploys Special Judicial Supervision on Illegal Cross-Jurisdictional and Profit-Seeking Law Enforcement], SPP, March 26, 2025, https://www.spp.gov.cn/tt/202503/t20250326_691422.shtml, accessed May 9, 2025.

[14]蒋小天, "法律界人士呼吁杜绝逐利执法，改革罚没返还制度" [Deep-sea Fishing-type Profit-seeking Law Enforcement Has Attracted a Lot of Attention. How Should It Be Governed? Legal Professionals Call for End to Profit-seeking Law Enforcement, Reform of the Fine and Confiscation Return System], 南方都市报 [*Southern Metropolis Daily*], 9 November 2024, https://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2024-11/09/content_19490.htm.

[15] Scoggins 2021; Shi and Zhang 2015. On strains on public security funding in the pre-Xi era, see Xie 2013; Xie and Shan 2013; Xie and Dang 2013; Ye 2006; Yao 2003.

[16] Chestnut Greitens 2017: 1002.

Figure 4: Categorical Breakdown of China's Internal Security Spending[17]



Figure 4 shows that the MPS continues to receive a much larger share of domestic security spending than any other actor. If anything, this share has increased, rising from 50% in 2012 to 57% in 2022. In nominal terms, this increase represents something between a doubling and tripling of the MPS budget over the course of a decade: from 361 billion RMB in 2012 to 832.7 billion RMB in 2022.

Figure 5 removes MPS so that budget allocations across other actors can be seen more clearly.

[17] The main previous analysis of these categories, covering 1996-2009 (Chestnut Greitens 2017) aggregated amounts from local figures, which employed different categorizations. Because this would not compare "like to like," and pre-2010 national-level categorical data are not available, Figures 4-5 cover only 2010-2022.

Figure 5: Categorical Breakdown of Internal Security Spending (excluding MPS)



The remainder of the domestic security budget goes to actors across the political-legal system including the procuratorate (*jiancha,* 检察), courts (*fayuan*, 法院), Ministry of Justice (*sifa*, 司法), customs anti-smuggling police (缉私警察队伍),[18] and other unspecified expenditures, as well as a continued category of funding for the PAP.

The biggest change apparent in the 2012-2022 data is what looks like a sizeable drop in the share of domestic security spending allocated to the People's Armed Police, from 17.5% of the internal security budget in 2012 to ~10% in 2022. Nominal PAP spending dropped in absolute terms from 205.6 billion RMB in 2018 to 123.6 billion RMB in 2019, rising again to 145.5 billion RMB in 2022.[19]

It seems unlikely that the PRC cut spending on functions carried out by the People's Armed Police by roughly 40% in a single year, especially given the relative continuity observed across other

[18] China's anti-smuggling police are a specialized criminal police force for smuggling cases. They are based in the General Administration of Customs (海关总署, Bureau of Anti-Smuggling), under dual vertical leadership of Customs and MPS. They are centrally funded and managed day-to-day by Customs; local public security organs have no direct authority over the anti-smuggling police, but the two are expected to cooperate. State Council 1998.

[19] Thus, despite the proportional drop, the absolute PAP budget in 2022 is still larger in absolute terms than the 124.6 billion RMB allocated in 2012.

aspects of the internal security budget. In fact, the same table that shows the PAP budget dropping from 2018 to 2019 also states that PAP spending in 2019 was 118.7% of its 2018 level – clearly at odds with the reported absolute drop, and suggesting that an unexplained change in categorization/classification or measurement may be affecting the statistics provided.[20] Moreover, the continued appearance of the PAP in the domestic security budget, rather than the defense budget, suggests that China's leaders continue to view it as having an internal security role.[21]

We assess that what appears as a drop in PAP spending likely reflects the reorganization in 2017-18 that moved the PAP into the national defense system, placing it solely under the Central Military Commission (CMC), rather than in a dual-authority arrangement with the State Council. Two aspects of that reorganization moved specific units out of the PAP. First, the Guards and Border Defense Forces were transferred to MPS. In Figure 4, MPS displays a non-linear increase in its share of domestic security spending in 2018-19 that offsets the drop in PAP expenditure share. Second, the PAP's Forestry and Firefighting Forces were merged (along with some non-PAP entities) into the new Ministry of Emergency Management, and therefore removed from domestic security spending totals altogether. If included, China's new emergency management expenditures in 2019 would offset about half the drop in PAP spending from 2018 to 2019.[22]

Spending Breakdown: Geography

Given how heavily China's internal security apparatus relies on subnational funding, it is also important to look at how such spending is borne at the provincial level. Figures 6-7 show domestic security expenditure by province, first per capita and then relative to GDP.

[20] This is the "final accounts as percentage of previous year" value.

[21] Wuthnow 2019. For what a PAP role could look like in a wartime/conflict scenario, see Rinaldi 2025.

[22] The decision to bring the PAP under the national defense system was implemented in 2018. See "中共中央决定调整中国人民武装警察部队领导指挥体制 [CCP Central Committee Decision to Adjust Leadership and Command Structure of the PAP]," *Xinhua*, 27 December 2017, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-12/27/content_5250896.htm; on what units the Ministry of Emergency Management incorporated from where, see Wang 2018.

Figure 6: Domestic Security Spending per Capita over Time by Province



Figure 6 suggests that every province in China has spent more per capita on internal security since 1992. However, per capita spending has been particularly prone to increase in locations that are politically sensitive. These include Beijing, as China's capital – consistent with a concept of "political security" that prioritizes protecting China's socialist system, the party leadership, and Xi Jinping as the core of that leadership – but also includes the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where security crackdowns appear to have required higher levels of spending both per capita and relative to regional GDP than China's other provincial-level units. (This finding is consistent with other research, which shows that these particular municipalities and regions are also allocated more internal security (PAP) manpower.[23])

Table 1, below, shows that provincial-level units that are plausibly more politically sensitive with respect to internal security (Beijing, Xinjiang, and Tibet) spent more on internal security per capita than other provinces in 2012, *and* that the gap in per capita spending on security between these provincial-level units and others has widened between 2012 and 2022:

[23] One could also plausibly include Shanghai as the PRC's major financial center. Wuthnow 2019.

Table 1: Per Capita Internal Security Spending in Politically-Sensitive Provinces

Year	Baseline (other) spending per capita	Sensitive province spending per capita	Difference	Ratio
2012	470	1310	840	2.8
2022	910	2750	1840	3.0
** Values reflect mean internal security expenditure (RMB/person, nominal)*				

In 2012, China spent 2.8 times as much per person on domestic security in the three most politically sensitive provinces (Beijing, the TAR, and the XUAR) as it did on average in the rest of the country. By 2022, it spent over three times as much, creating a spending gap of ~1840RMB/person each year between these provinces and the rest.

Figure 7 shows domestic security spending by province relative to GDP, as an alternative way of thinking about the financial burden imposed by security on each provincial-level unit.

Figure 7: Domestic Security Spending over Time by Province Relative to GDP



Conclusion

This article presented updated data on China's internal security spending from 1992 to 2022, with a specific focus on changes during Xi Jinping's tenure. Compared to the pre-2012 period, the

updated data reflect a mix of continuity and change. China's internal security expenditure has continued to rise, more than doubling from 2012 to 2022, but has risen mostly in proportion to the PRC's overall budget. The balance between central and local expenditure has shifted further toward local spending, which may increase pressure on local PSBs given rising local fiscal constraints. The Ministry of Public Security continues to receive the largest share of domestic security spending, with that share slightly increasing from 2012-2022; meanwhile, absolute spending on the PAP has increased while its share of internal security spending has declined, which reflects its 2017-18 reorganization. Domestic security spending per capita and relative to GDP continue to be higher in locations that are politically sensitive, including Beijing, Tibet, and Xinjiang. These data point to the continued utility of examining China's internal spending statistics, but also highlight the continued need to provide context to make them appropriate indicators that generate useful insight into China's coercive capacity, its political economy, and the functioning and stability of its overall political system.

REFERENCES

Blanchard, Ben, and John Ruwitch. 2013. "China hikes defense budget, to spend more on internal security." *Reuters*, 5 March.

Blasko, Dennis, and John F. Corbett, Jr. 1998. "No more Tiananmens: the People's Armed Police and stability in China, 1997." *China Strategic Review* (Spring), 80–103.

Buckley, Chris. 2011. "China internal security jumps past army budget." *Reuters*, 5 March.

Chen, Xi. 2013. "The rising cost of stability." *Journal of Democracy* 42(1), 57–64.

Chestnut Greitens, Sheena. "Rethinking China's Coercive Capacity: An Examination of PRC Domestic Security Spending, 1992–2012." *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 232 (Dec. 2017)*:* 1002-1025.

Chestnut Greitens, Sheena. 2023. "Xi's Security Obsession: Why China is Digging in at Home and Asserting Itself Abroad." *Foreign Affairs*, 28 July.

Chestnut Greitens, Sheena. "Local Fiscal Constraints and Grassroots Stability." *China Leadership Monitor* (June 2025).

Chestnut Greitens, Sheena, and Jake Rinaldi. "China's Approach to Social Stability in a Taiwan Contingency." Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, forthcoming.

Cheung, Tai Ming. 1996. "Guarding China's domestic front line: the People's Armed Police and China's stability." *The China Quarterly* 146, 525–547.

Fravel, M. Taylor. 2007. "Securing borders: China's doctrine and force structure for frontier defense." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30(4–5), 705–737.

Fravel, M. Taylor George J. Gilboy, and Eric Heginbotham. 2024. "Estimating China's Defense Spending: How to Get it Wrong (and Right)." *Texas National Security Review* Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer).

Forsythe, Michael. 2014. "China to ramp up military spending." *New York Times,* 3 February.

IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2002-2022. *The Military Balance.* London: IISS.

Liff, Adam P., and Andrew S. Erickson. 2013. "China's defence spending: less mysterious in the aggregate." *The China Quarterly* 216: 805–830.

Martinson, Ryan. 2014. "The militarization of China's coast guard." *The Diplomat,* 21 November.

McGerty, Fenella. 2024. "Asian Defence Spending Grows, China's Grows More." International Institute for Strategic Studies, 22 May, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/05/asian-defence-spending-grows-chinas-grows-more/

Ministry of Finance [MOF], People's Republic of China. 2025. "Report on the Execution of the Central and Local Budgets for 2024 and the Draft Central and Local Budgets for 2025." 5 March

2025, https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-MOF-Report_NON-FINAL_EN.pdf

Rinaldi, Jake. 2025. "Waging War Without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict." China Landpower Studies Center, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 24 April. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/

Scoggins, Suzanne. 2021. *Policing China: Street-Level Cops in the Shadow of Protest.* Cornell University Press.

史晓晨， 张海波 [Shi, Xiaochen, and Haibo Zhang]. 2015. "中国地方政府公共安全财政支出效率研究——基于DEA-Tobit的二阶段分析 [Study on the efficiency of public security expenditure by China's local government: evidence from a two-stage DEA-Tobit model]." 电子科技大学学报（社科版）[*Journal of Electronic Science & Technology of China (Social Science Edition)*], 17(1): 12–17, 22.

State Council, People's Republic of China. "Plan for the Establishment of the Anti-Smuggling Police Force." 9 July 1998, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2010-11/20/content_4225.htm

Tanner, Murray Scot. 2002. "The institutional lessons of disaster: reorganizing China's People's Armed Police after Tiananmen." In James Mulvenon (ed.), *The People's Liberation Army as Organization.* Washington, DC: RAND, 587–635.

Tanner, Murray Scot, and Eric Green. 2007. "Principals and secret agents: central versus local control over policing and obstacles to 'rule of law' in China." *The China Quarterly* 191, 644–670.

Nan Tian and Fei Su, "New Estimate of China's Military Expenditure," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, January 2021.

Wang Yong, "关于国务院机构改革方案的说明 [Explanation of the State Council's Institutional Reform Plan]," *Xinhua*, 14 March 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/14/c_1122533011.htm

Wang, Yuhua. 2014. "Coercive capacity and the durability of the Chinese Communist state." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47(1): 13–25.

Wang, Yuhua, and Carl Minzner. 2015. "The rise of the Chinese security state." *The China Quarterly* 222: 339–359.

Wuthnow, Joel. 2019. *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in the Era of Reform.* China Strategic Perspectives No. 14 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Institute for National Strategic Studies, April).

Xie, Yue. 2013. "Rising central spending on public security and the dilemma facing grassroots officials in China." *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 42(2): 79–109.

谢岳 and 党东升，[Xie, Yue, and Dongsheng Dang]. 2013. "'维稳'的绩效困境：公共安全开支视角 [The efficiency dilemma of "*weiwen*": from the perspective of public security expenditure]." 同济大学学报（社会科学版） [*Journal of Tongji University (Social Sciences Edition)],* Vol. 6, 90–100.

Xie, Yue, and Wei Shan. 2013. "China struggles to maintain stability: strengthening its public security apparatus." In Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), *China: Development and Governance (*Singapore: World Scientific), pp. 55–62.

么子国 [Ma, Ziguo]. 2004. "试论建立和完善公安经费保障机制 [On establishing and improving safeguard mechanisms for public security expenditure]. 公安研究 *[Public Security Research*], Vol. 12: 78–81.

叶永光 [Ye, Yongguang]. 2006. "对公安经费保障标准的若干思考 [Thoughts on standards for securing police budgets]." 公安研究 *[Public Security Research*], Vol. 1: 66–68, 75.