not only in unions but cartels and trade associations. Readers encounter the CSA’s Ordnance and Nitre and Mining Bureaus and conventions of railroad managers setting uniform rates. But where are the “powerful interest blocs” invoked at the book’s beginning? It is sober second thought, perhaps, that demotes the CSA from the “corporatist nation” advertised in the subtitle to possessing “several characteristics that paralleled those of twentieth-century corporate states” by book’s end (p. 189).

PATRICK G. WILLIAMS
University of Arkansas


The literature on the resurgence of authoritarianism that has followed the third wave of democratization has grown by leaps and bounds, but its coverage is quite uneven. One of the key areas that has not received sufficient scholarly attention is the coercive apparatus of the state. Within this category, the regular armed forces have been the focus of most studies, while the secret police—arguably an even more important agent of domestic repression—has been comparatively neglected.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens’s new book is therefore a necessary addition to the literature. Given the poor coverage of the topic, her book holds the promise of being something of a pioneering work. It does not disappoint. The book’s focus is placed squarely on two important and related questions: what determines the design of autocratic coercive institutions, and what effect does their institutional design have on patterns of repression and the use of violence against civilians? Throughout the book, Greitens clearly demonstrates not only that the institutional variations resulting from the design choices of authoritarian regimes result in different patterns of violence but also, importantly, that these variations are predictable. She argues that “the more fragmented, socially exclusive security apparatus, associated with a high initial threat from elites, is likely to be more violent” (p. 12) because division between security organizations impedes its capacity to process intelligence and, therefore, its ability to calibrate and direct its actions against its targets.

In her theoretical chapter, she lays out the logic behind the design and formation of coercive institution in autocracies, catalogs the threats they must address to stay in power, and explains how different types of threats lead to different institutional choices. She demonstrates when the choice is usually to resort to coup-proofing strategies that require the use of multiple and competing institutions (usually with overlapping functions and responsibilities)
and when the best option is to use a “unitary and inclusive internal security apparatus” (p. 17). Along the way, she provides a useful and insightful summation of the literature on coercive institutions that showcases her broad reading and keen understanding of several literatures (civil-military relations, security organizations, institutionalism).

Equally impressive are Greitens’s case studies, which serve her purposes well. She offers excellent, detailed, and tightly argued chapters on how coercion is organized in Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea and a second trio of chapters on how these institutions were used for repression in the same three countries. In a very valuable additional empirical chapter, she shows how her arguments travel to other settings, presenting brief studies on Chile, East Germany, and Iraq.

In sum, Greitens develops a rigorous theory of the origins and operation of autocracies’ coercive institutions. She clearly shows that the better-organized coercive agencies are also more effective: they can penetrate the communities they target easier and can achieve their objectives while using less violence than fragmented ones, in large part because they are also better at deterring dissent. Greitens’s book is based on her dissertation. It reads nothing like many books based on dissertations. In fact, her engaging and straightforward style propels the reader through the chapters—this may be seldom said about an academic book, but this one is actually hard to put down.

ZOLTAN BARANY
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From 1975 to 2011, more than 200 peace agreements concluding conflicts mentioned women in some fashion in approximately 40 percent of cases (p. 1; however, on p. 9, the figure is 32 percent). Drawing on the Burundi agreement (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, 2000), the Northern Ireland settlement (Good Friday Agreement, 10 April 1998), and the Macedonian treaty (Ohrid Framework, 2 August 2001), Miriam J. Anderson explores the conditions that lead to the inclusion of women at the peace table—or not. Her analysis embeds these cases in a study of the existing literature on peace building, mediation, negotiation, women and war, human rights, and norm diffusion thinking.

By and large, women inserted themselves into the agreements ending the Burundi and Northern Ireland cases because of several conditions. For one,